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ABSTRACT 
After finishing the process of investigating digital evidence on a forensic 
workstation, it is important for law enforcement to use a forensically sound machine 
when starting a new investigation.  To prevent cross-contamination of remnants 
between cases, most law enforcement agencies seek to have a controlled operating 
environment that can be reset to a sterile state which ensures that all remnants of 
previous cases are not present.  The discontinuation of Windows SteadyState™ has 
left forensic investigators without a viable automated solution for ensuring a 
controlled environment that protects the probative value of digital evidence.  This 
thesis project forensically validates and modifies an existing open-source 
SteadyState™ solution, Forensics Steady State, which will provide law enforcement 
officers with a viable substitution to other costly products.    
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In the modern day, the computer crime rate across the world is growing at a rapid 
pace.  Figuring out who committed a crime, using what device, at which location is all 
part of the puzzle law enforcement investigators are faced with when presented with 
digital evidence.  Following a specific forensic process is crucial when presenting 
analyzed evidence to the court system.  How does law enforcement collect and 
analyze digital evidence in a way that preserves the probative value of digital 
evidence? 
The digital forensic process is comprised of four main steps:  seizure, acquisition, 
analysis, and documentation.  Digital forensic investigations involve developing and 
testing hypotheses made about the present state of a computer.  Law enforcement must 
seize any device they feel is necessary that may contain digital evidence.  These 
evidence items include computer hard drives, cell phones, routers, switches, gaming 
systems, or any other electronic device that stores digital data. 
Once evidence items are seized, they are acquired using tools installed onto a 
forensic workstation.  Forensic workstations are often Windows or Linux machines 
that have software to prevent any original evidence from being altered in any way.  
During the acquisition phase, an exact bit-for-bit copy of the evidence is made in the 
form of an image file preserving the original state of the evidence.  After the 
acquisition phase, evidence is analyzed using forensic software that observes the state 
of the evidence image.  During analysis, investigators use this forensic software to 
search through the image to find information that either supports or refutes the 
hypotheses made for the investigation.  It is important that all of these procedures are 
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performed on a controlled, sterile environment that will not alter the original evidence 
in any way.  Finally, once the evidence image has been analyzed and the hypotheses 
made about the state of the computer has been made, all findings are documented and 
reported.   
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this thesis project is to improve an existing SteadyState™ 
replacement solution to create a Forensics Steady State tool for newer Microsoft 
Windows operating systems and to verify its forensic integrity so that it can be used by 
law enforcement investigators.  The result is a controlled, forensically-sound, 
Windows 7 environment that can be reproduced, re-used, and is free from cross-
contamination. 
1.2 Justification for and Significance of the Study 
When a forensic investigator analyzes digital data on a forensic workstation, 
he/she must be careful to maintain the probative value of the resulting evidence by 
being able to demonstrate that their investigation did not corrupt the evidence in any 
way.  A primary concern is cross-contamination, where digital evidence from one case 
that the investigator worked makes its way into another case, and in doing so 
undermines the probative value of the evidence.   Evidence from a previous case can 
include, but is not limited to: pictures, documents, applications, email, and viruses.  To 
prevent cross-contamination, most law enforcement agencies seek to have a controlled 
operating environment (e.g. the forensic workstation’s operating system and installed 
files) that can be reset to a sterile state which ensures that all remnants of previous 
cases are not present. 
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Investigators often use ad hoc methods for establishing a controlled operating 
environment.  One method is to wipe the forensic workstation’s systems disk and re-
install the operating systems and tools completely before each investigation.  Another 
method is to use a master image of the operating environment from which they clone a 
new investigation environment.  While these methods are commonly used, they 
present serious limitations. The first method is extremely time consuming and can take 
upwards of an entire business day to prepare a new forensic environment.  The second 
method can cause update lag, where new versions of tools are not updated in the 
master image for long periods of time due to the efforts required to produce a new 
image. 
In addition to these ad hoc techniques, there have been some automated 
techniques, such as Microsoft Corporation’s Windows SteadyState™, a free, simple, 
elegant solution to the controlled environment problem.  It allows administrative users 
to protect their systems from viruses, malware, and unwanted application installations 
by tracking all changes to a machine’s current state, and discarding them whenever the 
administrator chooses to do so.  Upon discarding the changes, the machine is returned 
to its original state.  Every change made to the system since its last save point is 
deleted.  Windows SteadyState™ has proven to be an effective tool for forensic 
investigators. Unfortunately, Windows SteadyState™ has been phased out since 
December 31, 2010 with Windows Vista being the last operating system supported by 
the solution [Microsoft Support].  This has left forensic investigators without a viable 
automated solution for ensuring a controlled environment that protects the probative 
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value of digital evidence that is compatible with Windows 7 and future operating 
systems. 
The goals of this research project are as follows: 
1. To make a controlled environment solution that ensures that a sterile digital 
forensics environment can be created each time a new case is started by law 
enforcement investigators. 
2. To make a controlled environment solution that is easy for forensic 
practitioners to use. 
3. To make a controlled environment solution that does not substantially delay 
investigations. 
4. To have a solution that does not interfere with the forensic process. 
5. To document the controlled environment solution behaviors proving forensic 
readiness. 
6. The reboot process of the solution should automate the roll back procedure and 
boot directly into a Windows environment after completion, as required by the 
Rhode Island State Police Computer Crimes Unit. 
1.3 Accomplishments 
This project documented the controlled environment solution behaviors through 
extensive testing to prove forensic readiness of Forensics Steady State.  The outcomes 
from this project ensured a stable, sterile digital forensics environment that does not 
substantially delay investigations or interfere with the forensic process.  Forensics 
Steady State also has ease of use for forensic practitioners including the added 
function of the automatic roll back. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 This chapter provides a survey of current solutions to the proposed problem 
presented in section 1.1 that support modern Microsoft operating systems.  One 
solution, Faronics’ Deep Freeze, is a commercial product that is marketed to preserve 
the state of a host operating system environment for general use.  A community 
supported replacement for the original Microsoft SteadyState™ provides techniques 
for users to develop their own solution.  Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine is also 
briefly explained. 
 
2.1 Faronics’ Deep Freeze 
 
Faronics’ Deep Freeze [Faronics] is software that can restore Windows, Mac OS, 
and Linux operating systems back to an original state that is pre-defined by the user.  
It can function as a SteadyState™ replacement, but previous research on Windows 
machines has shown that Deep Freeze is not compatible with the requirements of 
digital forensic investigations [Fonseca].  Problems exist with saving case information 
to external drives and removing external drives during the computer’s operation.  
Older versions of Deep Freeze have been shown to crash Windows 7 computers when 
evidence hard drives are attached internally and removed after the imaging process 
when using drive trays.   
Previous versions of Deep Freeze are also insufficient in that files can appear to 
be written to external drives, which are transparently locked, creating problems for 
retaining investigators’ case information.  We tested the newest version of Deep 
Freeze Enterprise and discovered that this problem still persists.  There are options to 
add certain drive letters to a “whitelist” during the initial creation of a Deep Freeze 
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solution that will allow those drives to be written to without write-protection.  This 
option is not easily accessible and the illusion of seeing the files copied to a 
destination drive, when the action does not actually occur, can be problematic for law 
enforcement investigations. 
 
2.2 SteadyState™ for Windows 7 (Panos Macheras) 
 
Currently, there is no formal SteadyState™ solution for Windows 7 provided by 
Microsoft.   In July of 2001, Panos Macheras, a Microsoft developer, released his 
methodology for creating a Windows 7 SteadyState™ like tool for use in internet 
cafés, educational computer laboratories, and other establishments that use Windows 7 
workstations [Macheras].  Macheras’ procedure claims to work on any machine, but 
through initial testing we have concluded that it is not an adequate steady state 
replacement.  Using Macheras’ methodology to create the Windows 7 Steady State 
replacement, we were not able to create a working Steady State.  The inability to 
reproduce Macheras’ work fails to provide a solution for goal 1 of this project.  Due to 
the fact that a working version of Macheras’ solution could not be created, the solution 
also fails to meet goals 2-4 of this research project as well. 
2.3 Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine 
Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine is another application designed specifically for 
Microsoft Windows that shares similar functionality to Windows SteadyState™.  
Drive Vaccine operates under Microsoft Windows and has the capability to rollback to 
previous baseline images if a system becomes corrupt with any form of system error 
preventing normal operation.  Drive Vaccine could be considered a viable option for 
digital forensic investigations, but it has not been forensically validated. 
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2.4 Steadier State 
 
In 2012 Mark Minasi, of MR&D, released his own open source version of a 
SteadyState™ replacement for Windows 7 which is named Steadier State [Minasi].  
Steadier State uses a technique called differencing disks to make the SteadyState™ 
solution function on a Windows 7 Enterprise or Ultimate machine that takes advantage 
of Windows 7’s ability to boot from Virtual Hard Disks. 
Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) files are virtual representations of hard disks that 
provide the same functionality as a regular hard disk drive.  VHDs encapsulate hard 
disk images that can contain partitions and file systems specific to the operating 
system installed into the virtual disk file.  VHDs were originally created for use as 
storage media for virtual machines that are running in Windows Virtual PC, Windows 
Virtual Server, or Hyper-V.  Windows 7 Enterprise and Ultimate editions and 
Windows 8 now have native support for booting from VHD files eliminating the need 
for a hypervisor.  When natively booting a VHD, performance is greatly enhanced and 
there is improved support for Operating System features that are not available in a 
hypervisor such as Windows Virtual PC [Calvert, 2009]. 
There are three different kinds of VHD formats that can be created: fixed, 
dynamic, and differencing.  Fixed sized VHDs are a static size that is stored on a 
physical storage device when the virtual file is created.  The size of fixed VHDs 
cannot be decreased, but can be increased when the file is disconnected and able to be 
edited [Jain, 2010].  Dynamic VHDs only use as much space on the physical storage 
device as needed to store the data in the file and can expand as new blocks in the 
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virtual disk are used.  Typically, dynamic VHDs have slower read/write performance 
than fixed disks [Jain, 2010].   
Differencing VHDs are comprised of two or more components, a parent VHD and 
one or multiple child VHD(s).  Any child VHD files are linked to the parent and 
represent the current state of the VHD as a set of modified blocks in comparison to its 
parent [Jain, 2010].  The parent VHD can be either fixed or dynamic in relation to its 
differencing child VHD.  Differencing VHDs are analogous to creating snapshots of a 
virtual machine when using a hypervisor. 
Steadier State utilizes the differencing disk technology in order to recreate a 
Windows 7 SteadyState™.  The baseline image.vhd acts as the parent VHD and 
snapshot.vhd acts as the child VHD caching any/all writes made when natively booted 
into the VHD file.  Currently, no explicit documentation has been released by 
Microsoft that explains exactly how a machine boots into a VHD using Windows 7 
Enterprise/Ultimate native boot to VHD ability. 
To implement Steadier State, users must follow a detailed course of action (see 
Figure 1). First, users need to create a boot disk using tools from the Windows 
Automated Installation Kit (WAIK) and scripts provided by the Steadier State 
package.  A media disk is connected to a prepared target Windows computer and a 
VHD image of the prepared computer is created onto the media drive using tools 
provided by the boot disk.   The resulting image is a VHD file that will be used as the 
basis for the new machine operating system.  Once that image is created, the hard disk 
containing the original operating system is wiped and prepared, and the VHD file is 
copied to the disk.  The disk now contains the VHD file that the PC boots into.  For a 
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fully detailed procedure of the process flow, including specific scripts for creating and 
deploying Steadier State, see Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1 - Process Flow Diagram: Creating and Deploying Steadier State 
 
When the user restarts the computer, two options are presented.  The selected 
option will determine which of several states that Steadier State could be put into (see 
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Figure 2).  The default first option boots into the Windows 7 environment caching all 
writes into a snapshot.vhd file.  The second option rolls back the system deleting the 
existing snapshot file containing all written changes to the disk made since the last 
rollback.  A new empty snapshot file is then created and the system returns to its 
original state.  If the user chooses to update software or make any changes to the 
system permanent, they must first place an empty text file named “noauto.txt” on the 
root of the D drive.  When the user reboots the computer, selecting the roll back option 
opens the WinPE environment and pauses at a command line prompt.  The user can 
then choose to run a merge script, provided by Steadier State, to accept permanent 
changes to the base image by merging the snapshot and parent image VHD files and 
creating a new empty snapshot file to cache future writes.   
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Figure 2 – Flow Chart for Steadier State 
 
During the initial testing of Steadier State, the solution seemed promising, but 
was also too difficult for the general law enforcement user failing to meet the 
requirements of Goal 2. Furthermore, it has not been extensively tested for forensic 
validation, a necessity for law enforcement, failing to meet the requirements of Goal 5.  
Steadier State served as the base implementation on which Forensics Steady State is 
based to improve the solution and meet the goals of this project.  Section 3.1 
elaborates on the extensive testing that has been conducted as part of the forensic 
validation of Forensics Steady State.   
 13 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This section describes how this project created the Forensics Steady State tool to 
meet the goals of chapter 1. It first outlines how this project thoroughly tested the 
existing Steadier State solution on which the implementation of Forensics Steady State 
is based.  Section 3.2 describes possible future enhancements to Forensics Steady 
State.  Sections 4 and 5 later discuss testing environments and procedures. 
Forensics Steady State was implemented using the existing files and command 
scripts provided by Steadier State with modifications.  The original boot process of 
Steadier State provides the user with two boot options every time the machine is 
restarted with Windows 7 is always being selected as the default boot option when the 
pre-boot environment is displayed.  Selecting the Windows 7 option boots the system 
into snapshot.vhd which will contain all changes and writes that currently reside on 
the image (Figure 2).  After restarting or shutting down the machine, the user is always 
presented with the options to “Roll Back Windows” or “Windows 7”.  This thesis 
project modified Steadier State to change the default boot process and add in the 
ability to scan the D drive for extraneous files. 
The modifications to Steadier State included adding commands into some of the 
provided command scripts to change the default boot order.  Goal 6 specifies that the 
Rhode Island State Police Computer Crimes Unit requires the reboot process of their 
forensic workstations to automate the roll back procedure and boot directly into 
Windows after completion, without requiring any user input.  In order to accomplish 
this task, the default boot entry was changed from “Windows 7” to “Roll Back 
Windows” by modifying the system’s Boot Configuration Data (BCD) store.  The 
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Boot Configuration Data store is a database file that contains the boot configuration 
for all bootable devices/partitions [Technet, 2007].  When the “prepnewpc” command 
is run during the Steadier State creation process (Figure 1), the hard drive that will 
contain Steadier State is wiped and partitioned to contain a copy of WinPE.  Within 
the command script of “prepnewpc”, commands were added that store the globally 
unique identifier (GUID) for the bootable WinPE partition after the storage device is 
prepared.  Then, commands were added to the “rollback.cmd” script that stores the 
default GUID in a file named “defaultguid.dat” which is saved to the same partition 
that stores both image.vhd and snapshot.vhd.  One last command was added to both 
the “rollback.cmd” and “merge.cmd” scripts that reads the GUID from 
“defaultguid.dat” and sets the Windows 7 boot option as the default for one time after 
a successful rollback or merge operation is performed.   
Now, when the user restarts the computer, “Roll Back Windows” is the default 
boot option (Figure 3).  The option to boot directly into the Windows 7 environment is 
still present in the pre-boot environment.  Once the solution is rolled back, the BCD is 
modified to automatically boot into Windows 7 after the baseline image is restored.  
Essentially, a user could simply shutdown or restart their Forensics Steady State 
solution and have a pristine Windows 7 image restored without any further user 
interaction. 
 15 
 
 
Figure 3 – Flow Chart for Forensics Steady State 
Additional functionality was added into “rollback.cmd” that recursively scans the 
partition containing image.vhd, snapshot.vhd, and defaultguid.dat for extraneous files.  
If any files are found, the user is prompted with a notification that additional files 
reside on the drive that should be removed before beginning a new case. 
In summary, the following additions were made to Steadier State to create 
Forensics Steady State: 
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 Automatic roll back upon shutdown or reboot of system without requiring user 
input. 
 Recursive scanning of physical drive for extraneous files and recommendation 
for deletion before beginning a new digital forensic investigation. 
 
3.1 Initial Steadier State Testing 
 
The first step of this project was to thoroughly test Forensics Steady State using 
the goals listed in chapter 1.   
3.1.1 Test Goal 1 
 
This test determined if Forensics Steady State ensures that a sterile digital 
forensics environment can be created each time a new case is started by law 
enforcement investigators, as stated by Goal 1. The test started by determining if the 
stated functionality of Forensics Steady State is reliably achieved. It should meet its 
claims that: 
 The .vhd file created by Forensics Steady State is never written to unless a merge 
script is executed. 
 All writes to the disk are placed within the snapshot.vhd file created every time 
Forensics Steady State rolls back. 
 The image.vhd file will never become changed.  Physically changing the bytes of 
an image with the use of a hex editor, the image’s bytes should always remain 
persistent and never change.  
I created an image of a forensic workstation and performed tests that included: 
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 Adding files and folders to a Windows 7 forensics workstation, rolling back the 
machine, and confirming all changes were deleted. 
 Installing applications to Windows 7, rolling back the machine, and confirming all 
changes were deleted. 
 Changing individual bytes on both the image.vhd (baseline image) file and 
snapshot.vhd file to confirm that once the system is rolled back, all changes were 
not kept and the original baseline image was intact. 
 Test the environment extensively with all of the most important digital forensic 
tools currently used by the Rhode Island State Police and other law enforcement 
agencies to ensure their proper functioning.  These tools include X-Ways’ 
Forensics, Guidance’s EnCase, AccessData’s Forensics Toolkit, and 
ForensicSoft’s SAFEBlock. 
 Test disk overflow behavior where more files are written to the environment than 
specified. 
 Test the ability to recognize external disk drives that are connected to the forensic 
workstation and the stability of hot-swapping external media. 
To confirm that a sterile environment is achieved in all of these tests, an MD5 
hash of the image.vhd file will be taken to ensure it returned to its original state.  In 
order to test assumptions about the system, bytes contained within the .vhd file were 
manually changed to test both “Roll back” functionality and write-blocking 
capabilities.   
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3.1.2 Test Goal 2 
This test determined if Forensics Steady State is easy for law enforcement 
investigators to use, as stated by Goal 2.  In order to test the ease of use of the Steadier 
State solution, I compared it to other comparable products Deep Freeze and Pacheras’ 
Steady State solution using the criteria: 
 The time and process of reverting back to baseline images using each product. 
 The time and process of updating the solution and retaining changes as a new 
baseline image for each product. 
 The process of keeping changes temporarily for each product. 
3.1.3 Test Goal 3 
 
This test determined if Forensics Steady State did not substantially delay 
investigations, as stated by Goal 3.  In order to test this goal, several aspects of re-
booting the solution were tested: 
 For an on-going investigation, officers need the ability to turn off their 
workstations without “rolling back” the machine and have their current 
analysis saved.  The re-boot time of the Forensics Steady State machine was 
timed and compared to a normal re-boot of a similar Windows 7 machine. 
 When software needs to be updated on the Forensics Steady State machine, the 
“merge” script will be run so that the solution retains the updates even upon 
“roll back”.  The time it takes to merge the snapshot.vhd file with the baseline 
image was recorded. 
 When an investigator has finished a case, the system must be rolled back, 
deleting any files, applications, or case remnants that may exist on the system 
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and retuned back to its original baseline image.  The time it takes to delete the 
snapshot file and re-boot to the clean environment was recorded and compared 
to the re-boot time of a normal Windows 7 re-boot on a similar machine. 
3.1.4 Test Goal 4 
 
This test determined if Forensics Steady State does not interfere with the forensic 
process and is stable by measuring if/how often the system crashes and how often that 
it runs appropriately.  Most of the tests in Test Goal 1 will help with testing stability, 
but more tests involving common forensics tools were also performed.  The software 
that was tested on the solution was consistent with tools that the Rhode Island State 
Police use. 
 
3.2 Testing Environment and Hardware 
The Forensics Steady State solution was implemented on a 500 GB Seagate 
Barracuda Hard Drive.  All hard drives used were tested on a Dell OptiPlex 760, x86-
based PC with an Intel Core 2 Duo (2.66GHz) processor, and 4 GB of installed RAM.  
The Forensic Steady State image was created using the Steadier State procedure for a 
Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise operating system.   
Section 3.4 outlines specific testing procedures used to validate the forensic 
integrity of Steadier State.  The testing procedures also include the testing of 
functionality of several programs commonly used by digital forensic investigators: X-
Ways Forensics, EnCase, FTK, and ForensicSoft’s SAFEBlock [ForensicsWiki]. 
The following hard drives were used during the testing phase of this thesis: 
 Make/Model Capacity Purpose 
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1. Seagate 
S/N: 5QM1H255 
Model: ST3500320AS 
500 GB Steadier State 
2. Seagate 
S/N: 5Q61QCTL 
Model: ST3500630AS 
500 GB Source Windows 7 
Enterprise  
3. Seagate 
S/N: 5QM1EXCS 
Model:  
500 GB Contains and 
deploys image.vhd 
4. Samsung 
Model: HD161GJ 
160 GB Contains Deep 
Freeze solution 
5. Western Digital 
S/N: WMAV33252519 
Model: WD1600AAJS-75M0A0 
160 GB Contains Drive 
Vaccine solution 
Table 1- List of Hard Drives Used in Experimentation 
 
3.3 Testing Procedures 
The following sections detail specific test procedures performed to forensically 
validate the Forensics Steady State solution.  The Forensics Steady State Test Plan 
was developed specifically to forensically validate Forensics Steady State to test all 
known areas of a hard disk that has the solution deployed to it.  In this case, specific 
tests were developed to make logical and physical writes to the two known partitions 
created by the solution as well as unpartitioned space and the boot records associated 
with each area of the disk.  Each procedure has detailed steps with test-specific 
functions built in to allow for a testing procedure to be re-used for validating each 
aspect of the goals for this thesis.  The test-specific functions for each test procedure 
can be found in Chapter 4.  Chapter 4 discusses each test individually, including any 
test-specific functions performed and the results and implications of each test.  These 
tests are re-usable for any solution similar to Forensics Steady State, such as Deep 
Freeze or Drive Vaccine, with the appropriate changes for each test made specific to 
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tool being forensically validated.  Table 2 lists all of the tests that were performed 
along with the expected results of each test. 
 
Test Requirement  Expected Results 
File and Folder Write Test Goal 1 All logical writes made to 
the system will be deleted 
upon rollback. 
Application Write Test Goal 1 All logical writes made to 
the system will be deleted 
upon rollback. 
Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot 
Record of Partition 2 
Goal 1 Raw hex writes made to 
the VBR of Partition 2 will 
be deleted upon rollback. 
Raw Hex Write Test – Within 
Unpartitioned Space of the disk 
Goal 1 Raw hex writes made to 
unallocated space of 
Partition 2 will be deleted 
upon rollback. 
Raw Hex Write Test – Within 
image.vhd of Partition 2 
Goal 1 Raw hex writes made 
within the image.vhd file 
will be deleted upon 
rollback. 
Raw Hex Write Test – Within 
snapshot.vhd of Partition 2 
Goal 1 Raw hex writes made 
within the snapshot.vhd 
file will be deleted upon 
rollback. 
Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot 
Record of Partition 1 
Goal 1 Raw hex writes made to 
the VBR of Partition 1 will 
be deleted upon rollback. 
Raw Hex Write Test – Outside 
Volume Boot Record of Partition 1 
Goal 1 Raw hex writes made to 
WinPE portion of Partition 
1 will be deleted upon 
rollback. 
Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C: 
Drive – Within Volume Boot Record 
Goal 1 Raw hex writes made to 
VBR of virtualized C 
Drive will be deleted upon 
rollback. 
Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C: 
Drive – Outside Volume Boot 
Record 
Goal 1 Raw hex writes made to 
virtualized C drive outside 
of VBR will be deleted on 
rollback. 
System Update Test – Using 
snapshot.vhd without Sysprep 
Goal 1 The snapshot file will not 
be accepted by Machine 2 
and will fail. 
System Update Test – Using Goal 1 The snapshot file will not 
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snapshot.vhd with Sysprep be accepted by Machine 2 
and will fail. 
Rollback Time Measurement Goal 2 The rollback times of all 
tested solutions will be 
similar. 
Update Time Measurement Goal 2 The update times of all 
tested solutions will be 
similar. 
Keeping Temporary Writes Goal 2 Forensics Steady State will 
merge the snapshot.vhd 
and image.vhd files and 
work successfully. 
Reboot Time Comparison Goal 3 The reboot times of a 
normal Windows 7 
machine and Forensics 
Steady State will be 
similar. 
Forensic Steady State Rollback 
Comparison to Normal Windows 
Reboot 
Goal 3 Forensics Steady State will 
take longer to rollback than 
a normal Windows 7 
machine takes to perform a 
normal reboot. 
Merge Time for Forensic Steady 
State 
Goal 3 The average merge time 
for Forensics Steady State 
will take between 2 and 5 
minutes. 
Disk Overflow Test Goal 4 Windows will not allow 
oversized files to overflow 
the disk and will prompt 
the user for additional 
storage media. 
Image File Write Test Goal 4 Forensics Steady State will 
be able to use forensics 
tools to create a disk image 
successfully. 
Forensic Tool Test Goal 4 Forensics Steady State will 
be able to run forensic 
software, create temporary 
case files, and be fully 
functional. 
Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to a 
Write-protected Internal Hard Disk 
Goal 4 SAFE Block will be fully 
functional with Forensics 
Steady State and write-
protect disk drives 
appropriately. 
Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to Goal 4 Any files copied to the 
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an Internal Hard Disk attached internal media 
will be copied 
successfully. 
Table 2 - Expected Results of Tests Performed 
3.3.1 Testing Procedure 1 
The purpose of Testing Procedure 1 is to investigate Forensics Steady State’s 
behavior when raw disk writes are made while booted into the environment, and to 
ensure that all files, folders, applications, and raw disk writes are deleted upon 
rollback of the solution, and that the original baseline image remains consistent and 
forensically sound.  The procedure can be re-used for each different raw disk write test 
performed to test Goal 1 and satisfy the claims in Section 3.1.1.   
This procedure uses Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) which is a cryptographic 
hash function that generates a 128-bit hash value.  In digital forensic investigations, 
the MD5 algorithm is used to generate a digital signature of files/disks.  These 
signatures are then used to validate images made of digital evidence to ensure the 
image is a bit-for-bit copy of the original file/disk.  Identical MD5 hash values indicate 
that the image is an exact copy of the original source evidence.  If the signatures do 
not match, then the image cannot be forensically validated because it does not 
accurately reflect the original media [Hoog, 2008].  This procedure makes use of 
Backtrack 5 R3 64-bit gnome for taking MD5 hash values of image.vhd in a 
forensically sound environment.  The procedure is: 
1. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State with 
BackTrack Live CD. 
2. Navigate to directory containing “image.vhd” and take MD5 hash of the file. 
3. Record hash value and shutdown machine. 
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4. Boot machine into Forensics Steady State environment, click “Roll back” 
machine. 
5. Perform test-specific functions. 
6. Shutdown Forensics Steady State environment. 
7. Restart machine and select “roll back”. 
8. When rollback is complete, shut down the machine. 
9. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State with 
BackTrack Live CD. 
10. Navigate to directory containing “image.vhd” and take MD5 Hash of the file. 
11. Record hash value and shutdown machine. 
It is important to note that if the MD5 hash value of image.vhd from Step 10 does not 
match the MD5 hash value taken in Step 2, then the baseline image of Forensics 
Steady State has been altered.  In this case, a new image should be deployed onto a 
wiped hard drive to guarantee the workstation is forensically sound. 
3.3.2 Testing Procedure 2 
The purpose of Testing Procedure 2 is to determine if Forensics Steady State is 
easy for law enforcement investigators to use.  In order to test the ease of use of the 
solution, it was compared to other comparable products - Faronics’ Deep Freeze, 
Pacheras’ Steady State solution, and Horizon DataSys’ Drive Vaccine.  The procedure 
illustrates the main differences in behavior between Forensics Steady State, Deep 
Freeze, and Drive Vaccine.  These differences include rollback times, updating times, 
and the method used to retain temporary changes until a rollback or merge is 
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performed.  The procedure can be re-used for each test-specific function to test Goal 2 
and satisfy the claims in Section 3.1.2.  The procedure is: 
1. Boot machine with hard drive containing Deep Freeze. 
2. Perform test-specific functions for Deep Freeze. 
3. Shutdown Deep Freeze environment. 
4. Boot machine with hard drive containing Drive Vaccine. 
5. Perform test-specific functions for Drive Vaccine. 
6. Shutdown Drive Vaccine. 
7. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State 
8. Perform test-specific functions for Forensics Steady State 
9. Shutdown Forensics Steady State. 
3.3.3 Testing Procedure 3 
The purpose of Testing Procedure 3 is to determine if Forensics Steady State does 
not substantially delay investigations.  This procedure works directly with the 
Forensics Steady State solution and compares it to a normal Windows 7 Enterprise 
machine like the forensic workstations that may currently be in use by law 
enforcement agencies and other forensic practitioners.  For the purposes of these tests, 
the source Windows 7 computer from which the baseline image for Forensics Steady 
State was built was used for comparison.  The procedure can be re-used for each test 
specific function to test Goal 3 and satisfy the claims in Section 3.1.3.  The procedure 
is: 
1. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State. 
2. Perform test-specific functions for Forensics Steady State. 
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3. Shutdown Forensics Steady State environment. 
4. Boot machine with hard drive containing normal Windows 7 OS. 
5. Perform test-specific functions for normal Win7 machine. 
6. Shutdown Windows 7 machine. 
3.3.4 Testing Procedure 4 
The purpose of Testing Procedure 4 is to determine if multiple Forensics Steady 
State solutions can be updated by copying and distributing the snapshot.vhd file from 
one updated machine to another Forensic Steady State machine.   Typically, updating 
an entire laboratory of Windows machines can be time consuming.  The motivation of 
this procedure is to determine if updating one Forensics Steady State solution can 
simplify the process of updating several machines simply by copying the snapshot.vhd 
file from the updated machine and overwriting the snapshot.vhd file on other un-
updated machines.  Observations will be recorded detailing if the changes are accepted 
and retained.  The procedure can be re-used for each test specific function to test both 
Goal 2 in terms of ease of use, and Goal 3 in terms of not substantially delaying 
investigations.  The procedure is: 
1. Boot first machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State. 
2. Choose the rollback option upon re-boot to ensure the original image is used. 
3. Perform test-specific functions for Forensics Steady State on machine 1. 
4. Shutdown Forensics Steady State environment. 
5. Boot machine 1 with BackTrack Live CD and attach external hard drive. 
6. Copy Snapshot.vhd from machine 1 hard drive to external hard drive. 
7. Shutdown machine 1. 
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8. Boot machine 2 with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State. 
9. Choose the rollback option upon re-boot to ensure snapshot file will be empty. 
10. Shutdown machine 2. 
11. Boot machine 2 with BackTrack Live CD and attach external hard drive. 
12. Copy over the Snapshot.vhd file from the external hard drive to the hard drive 
belonging to machine 2, overwriting the old snapshot file. 
13. Shutdown machine 2 and remove BackTrack Live CD 
14. Boot machine 2 and record behavior. 
3.3.5 Testing Procedure 5 
The purpose of Testing Procedure 5 is to determine if Forensics Steady State is 
functional with forensic software including X-Ways Forensics, FTK, EnCase, and 
ForensicSoft’s SAFE Block software write-blocker.  Typically, in digital forensic 
investigations, law enforcement must collect and image hard drives or other digital 
media and ensure all devices can be imaged while being write-protected to preserve 
the integrity of the evidence.  Law enforcement must be able to use their normal 
forensic tool suite when performing investigations.   The procedure can be re-used for 
each test specific function to test Goal 4 and satisfy the claims in Section 3.1.4. 
1. Boot machine with hard drive containing Forensics Steady State. 
2. Perform test-specific functions. 
3. Shutdown Forensics Steady State. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
 
This chapter discusses the tests performed to forensically validate the Forensics 
Steady State solution.  Table 3 lists all of the tests performed, along with which 
requirements they satisfy, and the result of each test.  For more detailed procedure and 
results, please see corresponding sections in this chapter. 
Test Requirement Result 
4.1.1 File and Folder Write Test Goal 1 Succeeded 
4.1.2 Application Write Test Goal 1 Succeeded 
4.1.3 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume 
Boot Record of Partition 2 
Goal 1 Failed – OS unable to 
reboot after boot sector is 
written to. 
4.1.4 Raw Hex Write Test – Within 
Unpartitioned space of the disk 
Goal 1 Failed – Writes remain 
after rollback 
4.1.5 Raw Hex Write Test – Within 
image.vhd of Partition 2 
Goal 1 Succeeded 
4.1.6 Raw Hex Write Test – Within 
snapshot.vhd of Partition 2 
Goal 1 Succeeded 
4.1.7 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume 
Boot Record of Partition 1 
Goal 1 Failed – OS unable to 
reboot after boot sector is 
written to. 
4.1.8 Raw Hex Write Test – Outside 
Volume Boot Record of Partition 1 
Goal 1 Failed – OS unable to 
reboot after disk is written 
to. 
4.1.9 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized 
C: Drive – Within Volume Boot 
Record 
Goal 1 Failed – OS unable to 
reboot after boot sector is 
written to. 
4.1.10 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized 
C: Drive – Outside Volume Boot 
Record 
Goal 1 Succeeded 
4.1.11 System Update Test – Using 
snapshot.vhd without Sysprep 
Goal 1 Succeeded 
4.1.12 System Update Test – Using 
snapshot.vhd with Sysprep 
Goal 1 Failed – OS unable to 
reboot due to snapshot.vhd 
belonging another 
sysprepped machine. 
4.2.1 Rollback Time Measurement Goal 2 Drive Vaccine has the 
fastest rollback time. 
4.2.2 Update Time Measurement Goal 2 Drive Vaccine’s update 
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time is instantaneous. 
4.2.3 Keeping Temporary Writes Goal 2 N/A 
4.3.1 Reboot Time Comparison Goal 3 Forensics Steady State 
reboots faster than a 
normal Windows 7 
workstation. 
4.3.2 Forensic Steady State Rollback 
Comparison to Normal Windows 
Reboot 
Goal 3 Windows 7 workstation 
reboots faster than total 
rollback time of Forensics 
SteadyState. 
4.3.3 Merge Time for Forensic 
Steady State 
Goal 3 Forensics Steady State has 
an average update time of 
01:33.60. 
4.4.1 Disk Overflow Test Goal 4 Successful 
4.4.2 Image File Write Test Goal 4 Successful 
4.4.3 Forensic Tool Test Goal 4 Successful 
4.4.4 Fixed Disk Test – Copying 
Files to a Write-protected Internal 
Hard Disk 
Goal 4 Successful 
4.4.5 Fixed Disk Test – Copying 
Files to a Internal Hard Disk 
Goal 4 Successful 
Table 3 - Test Summaries 
 
4.1 Goal 1 Forensic Validation Findings 
Law enforcement and other digital forensic investigators must be able to ensure 
that they are using a clean Windows 7 environment upon each new investigation to 
prevent cross-contamination between cases and preserve the probative value of the 
evidence.  Cross-contamination can include files/folders, malware, viruses, 
applications, and case data left over from a previous case that was analyzed on a 
specific forensic workstation.   
The most common method of preventing cross-contamination is to perform each 
investigation on a hard drive that had been wiped, re-formatted, and reconfigured for 
forensic investigations [Forensics Investigations].  Forensics Steady State eliminates 
the requirement to start a forensic workstation from scratch because all writes made to 
the system are placed into a snapshot file that is easily discarded once rolled back, 
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providing the user with a clean baseline Windows 7 image to perform more 
investigations.  While Forensics Steady State may be a fast and elegant solution for 
law enforcement to use, proper forensic validation of the solution is necessary to prove 
cross-contamination has not occurred. 
4.1.1 File and Folder Write Test 
The purpose of this test was to ensure that any files or folders created, used, or 
accessed during a forensic investigation are removed upon rollback of the host.  
Digital forensic investigations usually yield output files in the form of 
recovered/exported evidence files, case files, reports, and temporary files.  The 
artifacts produced by an investigation must be completely removed to prevent cross-
contamination between cases.   
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test.  The test 
specific functions included adding a text file and folder to the desktop.  Notepad was 
used to produce a plain text file “Test.txt” that was saved to the desktop.  An empty 
folder “Test Folder” with a copy of “Test.txt” in the directory was also added to the 
desktop.  Once both the text file and the folder containing a copy of the text file were 
added, the test continued with Test Procedure 1, which included rolling back the 
system and taking another MD5 hash of image.vhd. 
As expected, once the solution was rolled back, both the text file and folder 
containing a copy of the text file were deleted and solution was back to its baseline 
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state.  The MD5 hash of image.vhd remained the same retaining the forensic integrity 
of Forensics Steady State. 
Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 4 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.1 
4.1.2 Application Write Test 
The purpose of this test is to ensure any applications installed during an 
investigation on a forensic workstation running Forensics Steady State will be 
removed upon rollback of the solution.   
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test.  The test 
specific functions included installing an application and making sure any 
remnants/artifacts of that application are completely removed upon rollback of the 
solution.  Apple’s iTunes was installed on Forensics Steady State, and once the install 
completed, the test continued with Test Procedure 1, which included rolling back the 
system and taking another MD5 hash of image.vhd. 
As expected, no artifacts/remnants remained on the system after rollback and the 
solution was back to its baseline state.  The MD5 hash of image.vhd remained the 
same retaining the forensic integrity of Forensics Steady State. 
Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 5 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.2 
4.1.3 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot Record of Partition 2 
The second partition of the hard disk containing the Forensics Steady State 
solution houses both image.vhd and snapshot.vhd.  The volume boot record for 
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Partition 2 could be a target of malicious software, such as Cidox Trojan Horse 
[Symantec], that may be the result of cross-contamination from suspect evidence.  The 
purpose of this test to determine if malicious software can make writes to the volume 
boot record of the partition containing the vhd file that may not be reversed upon 
rollback of the solution.  In order to emulate writes to the boot sector, a hex editor, X-
Ways’ WinHex, was used to make raw hexadecimal writes while the solution was 
fully booted. 
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test.  The test 
specific functions included using WinHex to make raw hex writes to the VBR of 
Partition 2.  After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened.  Using a 
physical hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x130 within the 
volume boot record of partition 2 were changed from “00 66” to “AA AA”.  WinHex 
immediately displayed a Windows error message explaining that the disk writes would 
not be allowed: 
 
Figure 4 - Windows Error Message Not Allowing Disk Writes 
 
After the writes were made, the test continued with Test Procedure 1, which 
included rolling back the system and taking another MD5 hash of image.vhd.  The 
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MD5 hash of image.vhd remained the same retaining the forensic integrity of the 
baseline image.vhd image.   
Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 6 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.3 
 
However, after rollback, inspection of the bytes located at offset 0x130 within the 
VBR of Partition 2 had retained the raw disk writes despite the Windows error 
message.  The installed anti-virus software, Microsoft Security Essentials, also did not 
notice that the volume boot record had been altered.  This unexpected result presents a 
vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in that writes made directly to the disk outside 
of image.vhd or snapshot.vhd may infect a forensic workstation, causing the need for a 
clean Forensics Steady State environment to be created. 
4.1.4 Raw Hex Write Test – Within Unpartitioned Space of the Disk 
The hard disk containing Forensics Steady State was also examined outside of the 
two main partitions present on the disk within unpartitioned space.  The purpose of 
this test is to examine if malicious software has the ability to write to unpartitioned 
space on the hard disk.  Once again, WinHex was used to emulate raw hexadecimal 
writes to the unallocated space while the solution was fully booted. 
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test.  The test 
specific functions included using WinHex to make raw hex writes to the unpartitioned 
space.  After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened.  Using a physical 
hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0xE8E0C00000 within the 
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unallocated space of Partition 2 were changed from “00 00” to “AA AA”.  Windows 
unexpectedly allowed the writes, and after continuing with Testing Procedure 1 and 
rolling back the solution, the writes were retained.  This unexpected result presents a 
vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in that writes made directly to the disk within 
unpartitioned space may infect a forensic workstation, causing the need for a clean 
Forensics Steady State environment to be created.  The MD5 hash of image.vhd, 
however, was verified to be unchanged: 
Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 7 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.4 
4.1.5 Raw Hex Write Test – Within image.vhd of Partition 2 
 
With both the boot sector and unallocated space within Partition 2 of the hard disk 
being tested, it is necessary to examine writes to image.vhd and snapshot.vhd.  The 
purpose of this test is to examine the behavior of making hexadecimal writes within 
the image.vhd file while Forensics Steady State is fully booted. 
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test, with the test 
specific functions of using WinHex to make raw hex writes within the image.vhd file 
of Partition 2.  After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened and using a 
physical hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x74C6FC090 
within image.vhd were changed from “00 00” to “AA AA”.  As expected, Windows 
would not allow the disk writes to be made.   
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Testing Procedure 1 was then continued, which included rolling back the system 
and computing another MD5 hash of image.vhd.  After the test concluded, the solution 
was booted once again and WinHex was used to verify the writes had not been made 
despite the Windows error message. 
Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 8 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.5 
 
4.1.6 Raw Hex Write Test – Within snapshot.vhd of Partition 2 
 
After making raw hex writes to the volume boot record, unallocated space, and 
image.vhd files within Partition 2 of the hard disk, it was necessary to observe the 
behavior of the solution when writes are made directly to the snapshot.vhd file.   
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1, detailed in Section 3.3.1, was followed directly for this test, with the test 
specific functions of using WinHex to make raw hex writes within the snapshot.vhd 
file of Partition 2.  After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened and using 
a physical hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x2D090 within 
snapshot.vhd were changed from “00 00” to “AA AA”.  As expected, Windows would 
not allow the disk writes to be made.  It is also important to note that any raw 
hexadecimal writes made to any other files or the free space of this partition are also 
protected by the Forensics SteadyState solution. 
After finishing up with Testing Procedure 1, the test concluded with expected 
results in that the disk writes were not allowed and never made.  This was verified 
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using a physical view of the hard disk within WinHex.  The image.vhd file remained 
unchanged: 
  Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 9 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.6 
 
4.1.7 Raw Hex Write Test – Volume Boot Record of Partition 1 
With the second partition testing being completed, the forensic integrity of 
Partition 1 also needed to be verified.  Partition 1 contains the WinPE environment 
that Forensics Steady State uses to rollback and merge the solution.  The volume boot 
record of Partition 1 could be contaminated by remnants left over from a previous or 
current investigation being performed on a forensic workstation.  The purpose of this 
test to determine if malicious software can make writes to the volume boot record of 
the partition that may not be reversed upon rollback of the solution.  Once again, 
WinHex was used to make raw hexadecimal writes to the disk while booted into the 
solution. 
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific functions of using 
WinHex to make raw hex writes within the volume boot record of Partition 1.  After 
the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened and using a physical hexadecimal 
view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x within the volume boot record were 
changed from “00 00” to “AA AA”.   
Windows unexpectedly allowed the writes, and after continuing with Testing 
Procedure 1 and rolling back the solution, the writes were retained.  The installed anti-
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virus software, Microsoft Security Essentials, also did not notice that the volume boot 
record had been altered.  This unexpected result presents a vulnerability of Forensics 
Steady State in that writes made directly to the disk within partition 1’s boot record 
may infect a forensic workstation, causing the need for a clean Forensics Steady State 
environment to be created.  The MD5 hash of image.vhd, however, was verified to be 
unchanged: 
  Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 10 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.7 
4.1.8 Raw Hex Write Test – Outside Volume Boot Record of Partition 1 
The first partition of the Forensics Steady State solution must also be examined 
outside of the volume boot record.  The rest of the partition contains the WinPE 
operating system that is used to rollback and merge the solution when selected from 
the pre-boot environment.  The purpose of this test is to determine if any writes can be 
made to the first partition of the hard disk when booted into solution.  WinHex was 
used to make the raw hex writes to the disk. 
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific functions of using 
WinHex to make raw hex writes outside of the volume boot record within Partition 1.  
After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was opened and using a physical 
hexadecimal view of the hard disk, 4 bytes located at offset 0x3D0 were changed from 
“00 00” to “AA AA”.   
The results of this test were unexpected, as seen similarly in Test 4.1.7, in that 
Windows ultimately allowed the writes to be made without error.  After continuing 
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with Testing Procedure 1, the writes were retained after rollback.  These writes could 
be made to any file contained on partition 1.  It is also important to note that any raw 
writes made to the free space of this partition are also unprotected by the Forensics 
Steady State solution.  This result presents a vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in 
that writes made directly to the disk outside of the boot record of Partition 1 may 
infect a forensic workstation, possibly affecting the rollback and merge functionality 
of the solution.  This will cause the need for a clean Forensics Steady State 
environment to be created.  The MD5 hash of image.vhd, however, was verified to be 
unchanged: 
  Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 11 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.8 
 
4.1.9 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C: Drive – Within Volume Boot Record 
This test is designed to determine the behavior of Forensics Steady State when 
raw hexadecimal writes are made to the volume boot record of the virtualized C drive 
when the solution is fully booted. 
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific functions of using 
WinHex to make writes to the disk.  After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was 
opened and the virtual C drive was accessed with a logical view of disk.  4 bytes 
located at offset 0x20 within the volume boot record were changed from “00 00” to 
“AA AA”.   
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Once the write was attempted, a Windows error was displayed: “Unable to lock 
the drive, other programs may be using it.  Access Denied”.  Even though the error 
message was present, the writes were made to the disk.  The installed anti-virus 
software, Microsoft Security Essentials, also did not notice that the volume boot 
record had been altered.  This is evident because after Testing Procedure 1 was 
complete and the solution was rolled back, the solution was unable to boot.  This result 
presents a vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in that writes made directly to the 
logical C drive outside of the boot record may infect a forensic workstation, possibly 
affecting the rollback and merge functionality of the solution.  This will cause the need 
for a clean Forensics Steady State environment to be created.  The image.vhd file 
remained unchanged: 
  Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 12 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.9 
 
4.1.10 Raw Hex Write to Virtualized C: Drive – Outside Volume Boot Record 
 
This test is designed to determine the behavior of Forensics Steady State when 
raw hexadecimal writes are made to the virtualized C drive outside of the volume boot 
record within any file when the solution is fully booted. 
An MD5 hash value of the baseline image.vhd file was taken before the test to 
later prove the rolled back solution accurately reflects a clean Windows 7 image.  Test 
Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific functions of using 
WinHex to make writes to the disk.  After the solution was fully booted, WinHex was 
opened and the virtual C drive was accessed with a logical view of disk.  4 bytes 
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located at offset 0x1040 outside of the volume boot record were changed from “00 00” 
to “AA AA”.  
Once the write was attempted, the same Windows error from test 4.1.10 was 
displayed explaining the write cannot be made.  Even though the error message was 
present, the writes appear to have been made to the disk and after Testing Procedure 1 
was complete and the solution was rolled back, the writes were successfully removed.  
It is important to note that the free space of the virtualized C drive is also protected by 
the Forensics Steady State solution.  The image.vhd file remained unchanged: 
    Pre-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Post-test MD5 Hash 2aacf3dbe0501ad125290e24cf4c3c88 
Table 13 - Matching Hash for image.vhd After Test 4.1.10 
 
4.1.11 System Update Test – Using snapshot.vhd without Sysprep 
System updates are an important aspect of using forensic workstations within a 
lab environment.  As Windows or forensic tool updates release, it is important for 
computer forensic investigators to make use of all current technology as well as 
keeping their computers secure through Windows patches.  Updating multiple 
machines at once can be extremely time consuming, thus delaying future 
investigations.  Usually, when a master image is deployed onto multiple machines, the 
System Preparation (Sysprep) tool is used.  The sysprep tool prepares an image of 
windows for duplication and removes any system specific data from that Windows 
installation so that the image can be reused [TechNet].  
This thesis project explores the idea of using the snapshot.vhd file located on one 
machine to update another machine.  Specifically, it explores the notion of updating 
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one Forensics Steady State solution and using that machine’s exiting snapshot.vhd file 
to update multiple machines by replacing the older snapshot.vhd file. 
For this specific test, two Forensics Steady State solutions were deployed without 
the use of sysprepping the original baseline image.  Testing Procedure 4, detailed in 
Section 3.3.4, was followed directly for this test.  Once the first solution was rolled 
back, a text file and a test folder were added to the desktop.  The latest version of 
Apple iTunes was also installed.  With this solution being updated, it was shut down 
and the snapshot.vhd file was copied to external media through the use of a BackTrack 
Live boot disk.  The hard drive belonging to the second Forensics Steady State 
solution was then attached to the machine, and the snapshot.vhd file from the first 
machine was copied to the hard disk of the second machine, overwriting the second 
machine’s snapshot.vhd file.   
The second machine’s hard disk contained an exact copy of the snapshot.vhd file 
from the first machine.  The second machine was then booted successfully.  When the 
Windows environment was fully loaded, all of the updates made to the first machine 
were accurately reflected. 
Although it is highly unlikely that a digital forensics laboratory would deploy 
multiple machines without sysprepping, the possibility of using the snapshot.vhd file 
to update another machine, validated by this project, may prove helpful. 
4.1.12 System Update Test – Using snapshot.vhd with Sysprep 
Test 4.1.14 attempted to update a Forensics Steady State machine by copying 
over an updated snapshot.vhd file from another machine that was running Forensics 
Steady State.  Both machines were deployed from a baseline image that was not 
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sysprepped.  This test aimed to use the same procedure, but using two machines that 
were deployed from a sysprepped image. 
Additional test preparation was required for this test.  The original source 
machine was sysprepped and new baseline image was produced for deployment on 
Machine 1 and Machine 2.  The original Windows 7 image that was used to create 
image.vhd was sysprepped using the files and instructions in the Steadier State 
package.  A new image.vhd was then created using the Steadier State boot media and 
the image was deployed to both Machine 1 and Machine 2.  Testing Procedure 4, 
detailed in Section 3.3.4, was followed directly for this test.  Once the first solution 
was rolled back, a text file and a test folder were added to the desktop.  The latest 
version of Apple iTunes was also installed.  With this solution being updated, it was 
shut down and the snapshot.vhd file was copied to external media through the use of a 
BackTrack Live boot disk.  The hard drive belonging to Machine 2 was then attached 
to the machine, and the snapshot.vhd file from Machine 1 was copied to the hard disk 
of the Machine 2 overwriting the snapshot.vhd file.   
The reboot process of the Machine 2, now containing the updated snapshot.vhd 
file, failed and was unable to boot into the Windows 7 environment.  This result 
proves that a snapshot file cannot be shared between sysprepped machines and using 
the snapshot file is not an option for updating multiple machines running Forensics 
Steady State. 
4.2 Goal 2 Forensic Validation Findings 
Law enforcement investigators are typically trained to follow digital forensic 
procedures in the acquisition, preservation, and analysis of digital evidence.  This 
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includes having a working knowledge of existing forensic software and hardware 
tools.  These investigators often do not possess the skills necessary to troubleshoot, 
fix, or deploy forensic workstations.  An important aspect of using a forensic 
workstation during multiple on-going investigations is the system’s ease of use.  For a 
less technical savvy investigator, re-imaging a workstation after an investigation can 
seem like a daunting task.  The following tests focus on the ease of use of Forensics 
Steady State as compared to other solutions such as Faronics’ Deep Freeze and 
Horizon DataSys Inc’s Drive Vaccine.  
4.2.1 Rollback Time Measurement 
This first test investigates the process and time of rolling back a machine with 
Forensics Steady State, Deep Freeze, or Drive Vaccine.  Testing Procedure 2, detailed 
in Section 3.3.2, was used to measure the rollback times of all three solutions.  The 
test specific functions included simply choosing the appropriate rollback option for 
each individual solution.  In order to rollback Forensics Steady State, the user simply 
shuts down or reboots the computer leaving all default options selected.  Likewise, 
both Deep Freeze and Drive Vaccine roll back to their initial states with a simple 
shutdown or reboot of the system. 
Time was recorded with a stopwatch as soon as the machine was shutdown from 
a running Windows environment and the rollback option was chosen.  The time ceased 
to be recorded once every solution’s Windows environment completed the booting 
process.  The test was performed five times for each solution due to varying boot 
times and the results are presented in the figure below: 
Forensics 
Steady State 
Deep Freeze Drive Vaccine 
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02:23.51 02:21.35 01:27.26 
02:35.88 02:21.98 01:50:05 
03:01.55 02:02.49 01:14.77 
02:34.48 02:22.65 01:15.78 
03:08.65 02:30.06 01:10.00 
Table 14 - Rollback Time Comparisons 
 Forensics Steady 
State 
Deep Freeze Drive Vaccine 
Average Rollback 
Time 
02:44.80 02:19.70 01:23.60 
Table 15 - Average Rollback Times 
 
On average, Forensics Steady State has the slowest rollback time of the three 
solutions, with Deep Freeze falling slightly behind and Drive Vaccine being the 
fastest.  In terms of ease of use, all three of the solutions have intuitive functionality.   
4.2.2 Update Time Measurement 
Being able to perform Windows updates and updates to forensic software is 
imperative for law enforcement to keep their machines secure and guarantee they will 
be using the latest cutting edge tools.  The purpose of this test is to investigate both the 
update time and ease of updating Forensics Steady State, Deep Freeze, and Drive 
Vaccine. 
In order to perform updates to Forensics Steady State the user must make all 
desired updates and then place an empty text file named “noauto.txt” at the root of the 
C drive while booted into the solution’s environment.  Then, the user must reboot the 
system and select the rollback option from the pre-boot environment.  WinPE will 
then start and instead of automating the process of deleting the snapshot.vhd file, it 
will instead halt at the command prompt due to the text file at the root of the drive.  
The user must then type “merge” and hit enter to update the baseline image. 
 45 
 
Deep Freeze is updated using a control console on a separate workstation.  After 
making all selected updates to the system, the user selects to “thaw” the solution from 
the console application which will reboot the system without any write-protection to 
any fixed hard disks.  Once updates are performed, the user selects the “Reboot 
Frozen” option from the console and system retains all changes when restarted. 
Once desired updates are performed, Drive Vaccine’s baseline image is easily 
updated by simply clicking on the Drive Vaccine application within the environment 
and selecting the update option [Drive Vaccine User Manual].  No reboot process is 
required. 
 For Forensics Steady State, the update time was measured from the point in 
which the merge command was entered in the WinPE environment until the solution 
was booted into Windows.  The update time for Deep Freeze started when “Reboot 
Frozen” was selected from the console and ended once the system was booted into 
Windows.  Drive Vaccine’s update time was not recorded because it happens 
instantaneously and is negligible.  The test was performed five times with a stopwatch 
for each solution due to varying boot times and the results are presented in the figure 
below: 
Forensics Steady 
State 
Deep Freeze 
01:34.78 01:33.93 
01:33.56 01:31.72 
01:20.84 01:13.92 
01:31.51 01:23.80 
01:47.33 00:56.35 
Table 16 - Update Time Comparisons 
 
 Forensics Steady State Deep Freeze 
Average Update Time 01:33.60 01:19.90 
Table 17 - Average Update Times 
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On average, updating Forensics Steady State takes approximately 14 seconds 
longer than Deep Freeze and it does require minor technical ability. 
4.2.3 Keeping Temporary Writes 
Digital investigations performed by law enforcement may require an extensive 
amount of time on a forensic workstation.  These machines must be able to store case 
files/folders, keep imaging programs open, or let any processes continue working 
during non-work hours.  Each of the three solutions examined in Section 4.2 have 
methods of retaining temporary writes to the system without the worry of losing 
current work or data. 
Drive Vaccine allows users to keep changes temporarily by either leaving the 
active solution booted into a Windows environment or updating the baseline image to 
keep changes, which is not desired.  Deep Freeze can retain temporary changes by 
either keeping the solution in a “frozen” state or “thawed” state.  Keeping the solution 
in a write-protected mode will keep changes until the next reboot and all writes made 
to the system in a thawed state will be retained permanently, which is not desired.  
Potential problems could occur if power was cut to an active machine with Drive 
Vaccine or Deep Freeze installed.  For example, if a forensic workstation was taking 
more than a few hours to image a drive, this process may be left in the laboratory to 
complete overnight.  If power is lost to the building or machine in some way, the 
solution will rollback to its baseline image upon reboot, causing a possible loss of 
data. 
Forensics Steady State, however, operates much like a normal Windows 7 
workstation.  Any writes made to the disk will be kept temporarily until the rollback 
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option is chosen from the pre-boot environment.  The user also has the option to 
shutdown or restart the system and continue working with the current state of the 
solution.  All changes are only discarded when the baseline image is restored.  This 
can provide law enforcement with a form of safety net for digital investigations 
because the baseline image can only be restored if the option is chosen; losing power 
or other unforeseen circumstances will not cause the loss of data in Forensics Steady 
State. 
 
4.3 Goal 3 Forensic Validation Findings 
Performing a digital investigation in a timely manner is important for law 
enforcement to be able to process and complete as many cases as possible.  The 
following tests will determine if Forensics Steady State does not substantially delay 
investigations by comparing the solution to a normal machine running a Windows 7 
Enterprise 64-bit operating system. 
4.3.1 Reboot Time Comparison 
Two machines were set up to measure the reboot time of Forensics Steady State 
and Windows 7 Enterprise.  Test Procedure 3, detailed in Section 3.3.3, was used to 
measure the reboot time of each machine.  Each machine was fully booted into their 
operating system environments.  After fully loaded, each machine was restarted and 
duration of time it took each machine to fully restart into Windows was recorded.  The 
test was performed five times with a stopwatch for each solution due to varying boot 
times and the results are presented in the figure below: 
Forensic Steady State Windows 7 Workstation 
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01:00 01:10 
01:03 01:15 
01:02 01:18 
01:04 01:28 
01:03 01:27 
Table 18 - Reboot Time Comparison 
 
 Forensic Steady State Windows 7 Workstation 
Average Re-boot Time 01:02 01:19 
Table 19 - Average Reboot Times 
 
On average, the re-boot time of Forensic Steady State was 17 seconds faster than 
the machine running just Windows 7 Enterprise. 
4.3.2 Forensic Steady State Rollback Comparison to Normal Windows Reboot 
Two machines were set up to measure the rollback time of Forensics Steady State 
and a simple reboot time of Windows 7 Enterprise.  Test Procedure 3, detailed in 
Section 3.3.3, was used to measure the appropriate times of each machine.  Each 
machine was fully booted into their operating system environments.  After Forensics 
Steady State was loaded, the time it took to restart and roll back to the baseline image 
was recorded.  The Windows 7 Enterprise machine was simply restarted and the 
duration of time between reboot and being fully restarted was recorded.  The test was 
performed five times with a stopwatch for each solution due to varying boot times and 
the results are presented in the figure below:  
Forensics Steady State 
(Rollback) 
Windows 7 Workstation 
(Reboot) 
02:23.51 01:10 
02:35.88 01:15 
03:01.55 01:18 
02:34.48 01:28 
03:08.65 01:27 
Table 20 - Rollback of Solution Compared to Normal Windows 7 Boot 
 
 Forensics Steady State Windows 7 Workstation 
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(Rollback) (Reboot) 
Average 02:44.80 01:19.00 
Table 21 - Average Rollback Time (FSS) compared to Average Reboot Time (Win 7) 
 
Simply re-booting a machine running Windows 7 Enterprise is significantly faster 
than rolling back the Forensics Steady State solution by approximately 01:25.  The 
two machines are performing completely different functions but it proves that rolling 
back to a pristine baseline image in Forensics Steady State merely takes 01:25 longer 
than a simple reboot of a normal forensic workstation. 
4.3.3 Merge Time for Forensic Steady State 
The time it takes to update a baseline image of Forensics Steady State was 
measured in test 4.2.2.  Test Procedure 3, detailed in Section 3.3.3, was used to 
measure the update time of the solution.  The test specific functions included adding a 
test file, “Test.txt” and test folder, “Test Folder”, to the desktop.  The latest version of 
Apple’s iTunes was also installed.  The solution was then restarted, and the “merge” 
command was run to update the baseline image.  The update time was measured from 
the point in which the merge command was entered in the WinPE environment and 
was no longer recorded once the solution was booted into Windows.  The test was 
performed five times with a stopwatch and the results are presented in the figure 
below:  
Forensics Steady 
State 
01:34.78 
01:33.56 
01:20.84 
01:31.51 
01:47.33 
Table 22 - Recorded Times to Update Baseline Image 
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Average Update Time: 01:33.60 
Table 23 - Average Baseline Image Update Time 
 
On average, it took 01:33.60 for the baseline image to be completely updated in 
the Forensics Steady State solution.  This time is optimal and can allow for quick 
updates to be made to the baseline image for further investigative use. 
4.4 Goal 4 Forensic Validation Findings 
Goal 4 of this thesis focuses on system stability and functionality with forensic 
software to ensure the solution does not interfere with the forensic process.  Tests 
include observing how the system reacts to fixed disks being hot-swapped with the 
machine, disk overflow behavior, and general functionality with software that is 
consistent with tools used by the Rhode Island State Police. 
4.4.1 Disk Overflow Test 
The purpose of this test is to demonstrate what happens when the Forensics 
Steady State solution runs out of hard disk capacity.  Additional preparation for this 
test was required in the form of adding a second storage device to the forensic 
workstation.  In this case, a 1 TB internal hard disk was added to the system. 
Test Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific 
functions including the use of FTK imager to image the newly inserted 1 TB hard 
disk.  Once the solution was fully booted, FTK imager was opened and used to create 
an E01 image of the 1 TB drive.  The virtualized C: drive of Forensics Steady State 
was selected as the destination for the image file.  FTK Imager started to image the 
drive, segmenting it into parts until it required more space.  The remaining image 
segments were selected to be put on the D: drive until that too ran out of space.  Once 
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all storage locations were full, FTK Imager displayed a low disk space warning, 
reporting that only 978 MB of free space remained on the hard disk: 
 
 
Figure 5 - Disk Overflow Test Indicating Low Disk Space 
 
Imager also asked to write the remaining image segments to a new location, but no 
additional storage devices were added to finish the imaging. 
After finishing Testing Procedure 1, the solution was properly rolled back erasing 
all traces of the large E01 file and an MD5 hash of image.vhd was computed to verify 
the baseline image remained unchanged. 
4.4.2 Image File Write Test 
The purpose of this test is to verify that the Forensics Steady State solution 
functions appropriately when imaging external media.   
Test Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test, with the test specific 
functions including the use of FTK imager to image a 1 GB USB thumb drive.  Once 
the solution was fully booted, FTK imager was opened and used to create a raw dd 
image of the thumb drive to the desktop.  The image was created and saved 
successfully and after finishing Testing Procedure 1, all remnants of the image file 
were removed and a clean baseline image of the Forensics Steady State solution 
remained. 
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4.4.3 Forensic Tool Test 
The purpose of this test is to verify that Forensics Steady State functions properly 
with the use of a forensic tool and a software write-blocker.  For the purposes of this 
test, X-Ways’ Forensics was the selected forensic tool and ForensicSoft’s SAFE Block 
was used as the software write-blocker.  Both of these tools were included in the 
baseline image of Forensics Steady State. 
Test Procedure 1 was followed directly for this test.  The first test-specific 
function was to open X-Ways Forensics once the solution was booted.  After ensuring 
that SAFE Block was enabled, a 1 GB USB thumb drive was then inserted into the 
machine and was successfully write-blocked.  Using X-Ways Forensics, an E01 image 
of the drive was made and saved to the internal hard disk.  The image was then opened 
in X-Ways and two deleted files were recovered and saved to the hard disk to simulate 
case files that can/would be created from a digital investigation.  A total of 359 MB of 
case data, including the image, was created and saved to the machine.  X-Ways was 
then closed, and Testing Procedure 1 was finished. 
Both the forensic tool and write-blocker behaved as expected and all created files 
were deleted upon rollback of the solution. 
4.4.4 Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to a Write-protected Internal Hard Disk 
Similar Steady State solutions, such as Deep Freeze, have caused problems for 
law enforcement when trying to copy files from a forensic workstation’s local storage 
to an additional fixed hard disk in the system.  Internal hard drives are often attached 
to forensic workstations via an eSata port or card for either imaging or exporting of 
case files.  It is imperative for law enforcement to be able to hot-swap hard drives 
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during an investigation on a forensic workstation while using software write-blockers 
and forensic tools simultaneously. 
Testing Procedure 5, detailed in Section 3.3.5, was used for this test.  After 
booting into the Forensics Steady State environment, a 1 TB hard drive was connected 
to the system via an internal eSata card during operation.  SAFE Block was then 
opened to ensure the drive was write-protected.  To simulate writes to the newly 
attached write-protected hard drive, a text file, “Test.txt”, and test folder, “Test 
Folder”, were created and then copied over to the destination drive.  Since the drive 
was write-protected, a Windows error message was displayed indicating that writes 
could not be made to the drive.  The external drive was then disconnected from the 
system to ensure no abnormal behavior occurred upon removing the disk. 
The results of this test were as expected.  The solution had no problems 
recognizing the newly inserted fixed disk, write-protecting the drive, or detaching the 
drive during the machines operation. 
4.4.5 Fixed Disk Test – Copying Files to a Internal Hard Disk 
This test follows directly from Test 4.4.4 with the only difference being that the 
fixed disk added to the system will not be write-protected.  Law enforcement needs the 
ability to export case files and folders to external or internal media.  Solutions such as 
Deep Freeze write-protect all drive letters, unless this option is manually changed.  
Copying files to external media connected to a machine running Deep Freeze can be 
misleading in that the files may appear to be copied to their destination, but are not 
actually written to the drive.  Investigators may mistakenly think they are copying case 
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files to another storage device, reboot their machine to a clean baseline image, and 
realize the case files that appeared to be copied no longer exist. 
Testing Procedure 5, detailed in Section 3.3.5, was used for this test.  After 
booting into the Forensics Steady State environment, a 1 TB hard drive was connected 
to the system via an internal eSata card during operation.  SAFE Block was then 
opened and the newly attached drive was un-blocked allowing for the possibility of 
writes to be made.  To simulate writes to the newly attached hard drive, a text file, 
“Test.txt”, and test folder, “Test Folder”, were created and then copied over to the 
destination drive successfully.  The additional storage device was then powered off 
during the machines operation to ensure no abnormal behavior occurred.  Once the 
machine was shutdown, it was then booted into a Linux environment using a 
BackTrack Live boot disk to make certain the test files were copied to the additional 
hard disk. 
Writing the test files to the additional storage device was successful.  In 
additional testing with Deep Freeze, the test files appear to be written to the storage 
device successfully without error.  After examining the storage device in BackTrack 
Live, the files did not exist and were never written to the drive.  Forensics Steady State 
is more intuitive in that it acts exactly as the user would expect.  Once attached storage 
devices are un-blocked, writes are made to the drive, as expected.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Discussion of Results 
The results of all tests performed in Chapter 4 of this thesis helped meet all of the 
goals of this project.  This section will discuss all of the findings according to which 
goal each test satisfied. 
Goal 1 - To make a controlled environment solution that ensures that a sterile 
digital forensics environment can be created each time a new case is started by law 
enforcement investigators. 
Goal 1 was met because of the results of the tests in Section 4.1.  The logical 
write Tests 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 both performed as expected.  Once the solution was rolled 
back, any files, folders, or applications added to the solution were deleted and the 
solution was back to its baseline state. 
Tests 4.1.3 through 4.1.10 tested Forensics Steady State’s ability to recognize raw 
hexadecimal writes made to different areas of the hard disk, from both a physical and 
logical view, and cache those writes within the snapshot VHD file.  Tests 4.1.5, 4.1.6, 
and 4.1.10 all performed as expected.  Any raw hex writes made in Partition 2 within 
unallocated space, within image.vhd, or within snapshot.vhd were all deleted upon 
rollback of the solution, as expected.  Any writes made to the virtual C drive outside 
of the volume boot record were also eradicated upon rollback.  Test 4.1.4, however, 
failed in that it allowed raw writes to be made to the unpartitioned space of the disk 
showing that unused area of the hard disk are not protected by Forensics Steady State. 
Test 4.1.11 attempted to use the snapshot.vhd file located on one machine to 
update another.  Updating one Forensics Steady State solution and using that 
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machine’s existing snapshot.vhd file to update multiple machines by replacing the 
older snapshot.vhd file was successful for solutions that were not sysprepped.  This 
may not serve any practical purposes because the forensic workstations in a laboratory 
are most likely sysprepped beforehand.  Test 4.1.12 explored the idea of performing 
the same test on two sysprepped machines, but failed proving multiple machines 
cannot be updated by simply using a snapshot file from another machine.  In this case, 
either each machine would need to be updated separately or a new updated master 
image could be used to re-image each individual machine in a laboratory setting.   
Tests 4.1.3, 4.1.7, 4.1.8, 4.1.9, and 4.1.12 all had unexpected results and are 
discussed later in Section 5.2. 
Goal 2 - To make a controlled environment solution that is easy for forensic 
practitioners to use. 
Goal 2 was met because of the results of the tests in Section 4.2.  Test 4.2.1 
focused on the process of rolling back the solution and the roll back time measurement 
of Forensics Steady State, Deep Freeze, and Drive Vaccine.  In terms of ease of use, 
the user simply needs to restart or shutdown any of the three solutions to roll back and 
return to them to their initial state.  Forensics Steady State has the slowest rollback 
time of the three solutions, with Deep Freeze falling slightly behind, and Drive 
Vaccine being the fastest.  On average, Forensics Steady State took 02:44.80 to 
rollback to its original state. 
Test 4.2.2 focused on the process of updating each solution and measured the 
update time of each of the three solutions previously discussed.  In terms of ease of 
use, the process for each solution is described in detail in section 4.2.2.  Each solution 
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has its own intricacies involved with updating the baseline image, and can be fully 
understood with the provided literature for each.  In this case, Drive Vaccine updated 
the fastest.  On average, Forensics Steady State took 01:33.60 to merge the 
snapshot.vhd and image.vhd files and update the original baseline image. 
Test 4.2.3 tested Forensics Steady State’s ability to keep writes temporarily.  This 
allows investigators the ability to shutdown a forensic workstation and continue 
working with the current state of the solution at any time without losing any data until 
the solution is rolled back.  This can provide law enforcement with a form of safety 
net for digital investigations because the baseline image can only be restored if the 
option is chosen.  Any unforeseen circumstances will not cause the loss of data. 
Goal 3 - To make a controlled environment solution that does not substantially 
delay investigations. 
Goal 3 was met because of the results of the tests in Section 4.3.  Test 4.3.1 
measured and compared the re-boot time of Forensics Steady State and a normal 
workstation with Windows 7 Enterprise installed.  Unexpectedly, Forensics Steady 
State rebooted with an average time 01:02.  On average, the re-boot time of Forensics 
Steady State was 17 seconds faster than the machine running Windows 7.  
Test 4.3.2 compared the rollback time of Forensics Steady State to the re-boot 
time of the same Windows 7 workstation in Test 4.3.1.  As expected, the machine 
running Windows 7 re-booted 01:25 faster than Forensics Steady State could rollback 
to its baseline image.  Although each machine was performing different functions, it 
proves that rolling back to a pristine baseline image in Forensics Steady State merely 
takes 01:25 longer than a simple re-boot of a normal forensic workstation. 
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Test 4.3.3 measured the time needed for Forensics Steady State to merge its 
snapshot.vhd and image.vhd files permanently changing the baseline image.  On 
average, it took 01:33.6 for the baseline image to be completely updated in the 
solution.  This time allows for quick updates to be made to the baseline image for 
further investigative use. 
Goal 4 - To have a solution that does not interfere with the forensic process. 
Goal 4 was met because of the results of the tests in Section 4.4.  Test 4.4.1 
observed the behavior of Forensics Steady State when hard disk capacity was low or 
about to overflow.  As expected, the solution gave an error message stating that disk 
space was low when an oversized image was being saved to the hard disk. 
Tests 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 utilized functions of FTK Imager, X-Ways’ Forensics, and 
SAFE Block to ensure proper functionality with Forensics Steady State.  All tools 
worked as expected, and any temporary files such as images, case files, and recovered 
files were removed upon rollback of the solution. 
Tests 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 tested the actions of attaching and write-protecting internal 
hard disks while Forensics Steady State was operating.  Specifically, Test 4.4.4 
verified that inserting a fixed disk, write-protecting that disk, and attempting to copy 
files to the disk all behaved as expected.  Test 4.4.5 tested the same procedure, but 
without write-protecting the fixed disk to make sure normal copying functions could 
be performed.  Previous tests with older versions of Deep Freeze caused system 
crashes when internal disks were added to the system during operation.  In additional 
testing with newer versions of Deep Freeze, the test files appear to be written to the 
storage device successfully without error, but after examining the storage device with 
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BackTrack Live, the files did not exist and were never actually written to the drive.  
This result would not be desired for investigators trying to export reports or temporary 
case files to an external device, thus proving Forensics Steady State is a more viable 
solution for digital forensic investigations. 
Goal 5 - To document the controlled environment solution behaviors proving 
forensic readiness. 
Goal 5 was met through the production of this thesis.  All of the tests developed 
in the Forensics Steady State Test Plan provides a forensic validation of Forensics 
Steady State.  The tests were performed in a scientific manner and all results were 
carefully documented.  Each test was reproduced several times to prove that particular 
behaviors of a specific test occurred each time the same test was performed. 
Goal 6 – The reboot process of the solution should automate the roll back procedure 
and boot directly into a Windows environment after completion, as required by the 
Rhode Island State Police Computer Crimes Unit. 
Goal 6 was met through the functionality that was added to the base 
implementation of Steadier State to create Forensics Steady State.  With the addition 
of automating the rollback procedure, a user could essentially perform a simple 
shutdown or restart of their Forensics Steady State solution and have a pristine 
Windows 7 image restored without any future user interaction.  Also, the additional 
functionality that scans the physical drive for extraneous files gives investigators 
notification that more files should be deleted manually before beginning a new case to 
prevent cross-contamination. 
5.2 Interesting Results 
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Several tests run during the process of this thesis yielded interesting results.  Tests 
4.1.3, 4.1.7, and 4.1.9 all used Test Procedure 1 to make raw hex writes to the volume 
boot records of specific locations on disk.  Test 4.1.3 included making hex writes to 
the volume boot record of Partition 2, the area of the disk storing image.vhd and 
snapshot.vhd.  Test 4.1.7 made hex writes to the volume boot record of Partition 1, the 
area of the disk storing the WinPE operating system files.  Finally, Test 4.1.9 made 
hex writes within the volume boot record of the virtualized C drive that can be viewed 
logically when booted into Forensics Steady State.  Despite Windows error messages 
and the fact that the anti-virus software Microsoft Security Essentials did not catch 
that writes were made, all of the writes were allowed to be made to the boot sectors 
and resulted in failure to boot the solution after restarting or shutting down the system. 
These unexpected results present a vulnerability of Forensics Steady State in that 
the boot sectors of any physical or logical partitions are not protected.  This opens the 
possibility of viruses/malware infecting the boot sectors of the logical or physical boot 
sectors on the hard disk.  Although it is highly unlikely that an infection would occur 
in the boot sector of the WinPE partition, an investigator would still be able to 
maintain the probative value of the evidence located in the second partition because 
the virtual files are fully protected by Forensics Steady State.  Any viruses/malware 
that may affect the boot sector of the second partition would rely on another piece of 
malicious code residing within the current state of the system, which can be rolled 
back and eradicated making the infection harmless to the evidence.  Finally, if the 
solution no longer functioned as a result of an infection, an investigator would still be 
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able to extract any current evidence from the solution because the virtual disks are 
completely protected by Forensics Steady State. 
5.3 Future Work 
In order to ensure Forensics Steady State can be used for an extensive period of 
time for forensic practitioners, some future work is required.  Most importantly, 
Forensics Steady State should be extended for use with Windows 8 and future 
Microsoft Operating Systems to keep up to date with any forensic tools that require 
newer operating systems.  Other future work includes making changes to the existing 
Forensics Steady State solution to make it more functional for law enforcement.   
One such addition would be to prevent accidental rollback of the solution by 
adding in a warning prompt whenever the option is chosen in the pre-boot 
environment.  Another recommended addition would be the provision of MD5 and 
SHA-1 hashes of image.vhd in the pre-boot environment to verify that a sterile 
environment has been achieved and the integrity of the baseline image is preserved.  
This would include re-hashing image.vhd every time the system is rolled back. 
Another functional addition to Forensics Steady State would be to add the ability 
to scan new system for drivers to be included in WinPE while before solution is 
deployed.  This would eradicate any problems with the system’s communication to 
hardware. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The results of this research show that Forensics Steady State is a viable solution 
for law enforcement to use.  Without having the capability of using current Windows 
operating systems, law enforcement investigations have been delayed severely.  
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Eliminating the need to wipe hard drives belonging to forensic workstations upon 
completion of an investigation will facilitate the possibility of completing more case 
investigations.  Instead of spending part or all of a business day preparing a new 
forensic workstation, investigators can simply use Forensics Steady State’s ability to 
rollback to a forensically sound baseline image within just a few minutes.  Updating 
the solution is also an easy task and can keep the Windows 7 environment secure and 
forensic tools up to date. 
This research does suggest that Forensics Steady State is vulnerable to malware 
or other infectious viruses that particularly affect the boot sectors of the solution.  It is 
important to note that the competitor products, Deep Freeze and Drive Vaccine, both 
exhibit the same behavior when raw writes are made to the disk.  Forensics Steady 
State also lacks in speed when it comes to updating and rolling back the solution, but 
the minimal extra time required is negligible and still saves law enforcement the 
extensive process of starting from scratch after each investigation.   
In conclusion, this thesis attempted to forensically validate and add features to the 
Steadier State solution created by Mark Minasi for use at the Rhode Island State 
Police Computer Crimes Unit.  Forensics Steady State is an elegant, free Steady State 
solution that is forensically sound for use in digital forensic investigations. 
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APPENDIX 1: Forensics Steady State Creation Process 
 
 
Download the necessary files: 
 
Download WAIK from Microsoft: http://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/download/details.aspx?id=5753 
Confirm it is the WAIK download from August 5, 2009 
Burn this ISO file to a DVD or use an image mounter 
Download the Steadier State files: http://www.steadierstate.com/ 
Create a folder  C:\sdrstate and copy all of the files from the download to this 
directory 
 
Creating SS bootable USB or CD: 
 
1. Open a command prompt with administrator privileges. 
2. Navigate to C:\sdrstate and type the command:  buildpe. Choose which type of 
bootable media is desired: 
a. Bootable USB Stick 
b. ISO file that can be burned to DVD/CD  
 
Creating the VHD from source PC: 
 
1. Install all programs, change all settings, and fully prepare the PC you would like to 
deploy as SS. 
2. Sysprep source PC. 
3. Power down the PC. 
4. Connect the PC to either external storage or insert a second hard drive into the 
computer. 
5. Boot the computer into the SS bootable media created in previous section. 
6. Run the following command to convert the PC to a VHD image file.  (Note:  The 
external storage that will store the VHD file must be at least 2.5 times the maximum 
VHD size) 
cvtvhd %sourceDriveLetter% %desitnationDriveLetter% 
%MaxVHDSize% 
Example: cvtvhd c: d: 50 
7. Shutdown the computer. 
 
 
Deploy the image: 
 
1. Remove any external storage. 
2. Add a single wiped hard drive either internally or externally, ensuring it is the only 
storage in the machine.  This hard drive will become the target PC that Steadier State 
is running from. 
3. Boot back into the SS bootable media. 
4. Run the command:  prepnewpc 
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5. Now, connect the hard drive containing the VHD file. 
6. Use the following command to copy the image file over to the target hard drive. 
robocopy %sourceDriveLetter% %desitnationDriveLetter% 
image.vhd /mt:50 
(Note: Make sure the size is the same used in previous section) 
7. Upon completion, disconnect the external storage and shutdown.   
8. Remove all drives from the PC ensuring that only the Target drive remains. 
9. Boot into Steadier State. 
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